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The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates
to the "Least Restrictive Environment"
and Appropriate Mainstreaming
DARVIN L. MILLER*
and
MARILEE A. MILLER**
Education is one of the most valuable, expensive, and basic com-
modities supplied by the state to its citizens. It is so vital to the develop-
ment of responsible, educated citizens and economically productive
workers, all fifty states have compulsory school laws.' Parents or guar-
dians have a responsibility imposed by the state to make sure every child
receives the education offered by the state. The state has a reciprocal
responsibility to provide every child with an adequate education.2
Perhaps one of the most difficult areas that the state has faced in pro-
viding an adequate education to all children is the area of the handicap-
ped. Of the approximately 8 million handicapped children between birth
and age 21, only 3.9 million are receiving an appropriate education.3 Of
*Associate Professor of Educational Psychology and Exceptional Education, Coor-
dinator of Programs in Exceptional Education in the School of Education, University of
Wisconsin-Stevens Point. B.A., 1952, Westmar College; M. .S., 1961, University of Col-
orado; Ed.D., 1970, Ball State University; post-doctoral study, 1973, University of Min-
nesota. President-elect of the Wisconsin Division of Early Childhood/Council for Excep-
tional Children and Chairman of the First State Conference on Early Childhood-
Handicapped; member of the Planning Committee for the Annual State Conference,
Wisconsin Council for Exceptional Children; member of the Z-Group and Sub-committee
for Writing Standards on State Teacher Preparation in Exceptional Education; member of
the State Advisory Committee for the Early Childhood: Exceptional Educational Needs
Project, Department of Public Instruction; President, Board of Directors, Sunburst Youth
Homes, Neillsville, Wisconsin.
**Law Clerk for Chief Justice Allan G. Shepard, Idaho Supreme Court. B.A., 1974, In-
diana University; J.D., 1977, University of Wisconsin. Member of the Wisconsin State
Bar.
'E.g., Wis. Stat. § 118.15 (1975). As of August 9, 1973, compulsory attendance also ap-
plies to children with "exceptional educational needs." Wis. Stat. § 115.82 (1975).
'The term "state" is used to refer to either government in general or a particular state.
Either sense of the word produces a valid concept.
'This information is on file with the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, U.S. Of-
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the remaining handicapped children, 1.75 million are receiving no educa-
tional services, and 2.5 million are receiving inappropriate instruction.4
Furthermore, because their educational handicaps -have not been iden-
tified, there are still other handicapped children that would fall into the
two latter categories.
For more than a decade, long before the passage of 20 U.S.C.
§§1401-1420 (Supp. 1976) (Public Law No. 94-142 (1975), many concerned
citizens and educators were similarly concerned about the number of han-
dicapped children who were not receiving educational services.5 But an
equally disturbing issue was being raised by a few enlightened special
educators: that many handicapped children who had been identified were
receiving inappropriate instruction. Studies were showing that children
who had been identified, diagnosed, and placed in special classes or
schools relating to disability categories possessed greater ability than
what was being realized in those placements. 6 Special education's prac-
tice of removing identified handicapped children from regular education
and placing them in special classes or schools for special instruction was
brought up for serious reconsideration by the end of the sixties.7
There were those in special education who saw inappropriate placement
and instruction to lie primarily in the assessment model being used. By
the end of the sixties and early seventies, these professionals (Cohn,
1967; Dunn, 1968; Severson, 1970; Lilly, 1970; Samuels, 1971; Bateman,
1972; Deno, 1973; and others) were arguing that failure to learn should
not necessarily be cause for examining the child for internal states which
would suggest the inability to be educated.8 Focusing attention ex-
clusively on the child in diagnosis often unfairly places the responsibility
for failure on that child.9
The two primary traditional models of assessment utilized for many
years include:
1) the medical-etiological model which attempts to set forth
causal rationale for past failure and focuses on remediating the
disability or disabilities via different therapies;
2) the psycho-educational model which stresses the correc-
tion of the disability or-disabilities that have been assessed
with standardized achievement, ability, and diagnostic tests
dealing with the central psychological processes of the child.
To search for the defect that resides in the child and to point an accusing
5Melcher, Law, Litigation, and Handicapped Children, 43 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 128
(1976).
1B. GEARHEART & M. WEISHAHN. THE HANDICAPPED CHILD IN THE REGULAR CLASSROONI V
(1976).
1K. BEERY. MODELS FOR MAINSTREAMING 30 (1972).
'S. DENO & P. MIRKIN. BASIC PROCEDURES IN DATA BASED INSTRUCTION 1-3 (1974) (Special
Education Project, USOE #0-71-4155-603).
9See Deno, Special Education as Developmental Capita 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 229
(1970).
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finger of cause at the child is to focus attention away from external
variables which educators can implement for conditions of optimal in-
struction. Hence, to more effectively assess handicapped children, there
should be a search toward hov best to match the specific needs of
children with appropriate instructional alternatives which can be made
available to them to educate them and nurture their self-realization. 0 In-
structional options need to be isolated within the context in which the
child is expected to perform in order to expedite academic and social
change for the child.
The voices of special educators who were asking for reconsideration
would perhaps have remained faint if it had not been for court decisions
that only accelerated the inevitable. The right of a handicapped child to
an appropriate educational program was being reviewed by the courts.
To provide the least restrictive alternative environment for handi-
capped pupils, the cascade system" for placement is a programing model
whereby handicapped pupils could gradually transfer back to the
mainstream. 12 What was discovered almost immediately, however, was
l°Handicapped children not only have a right to an education; they have a right to an
effective, appropriate education. This concept has recently been relied upon for normal
children, also. For example, there have been some cases in California where parents have
sued the schools and state for graduating their children when those children have not ac-
quired basic reading and mathematical skills. The school's duty is not only to teach, but to
ensure learning.
"The cascade model involves a "cascade of services." The objective is to put the child in
the "least restrictive environment." In other words, an institutional setting or home for
the handicapped is more restrictive than a segregated class or handicapped day school.
Similarly, having a special education teacher come into the regular classroom at various
times to help the handicapped child or segregating the child for certain periods is less
restrictive than segregated classes for the handicapped only. The handicapped child must
be placed in a program that is as close to a regular education as possible, without denying
him the special assistance he needs to achieve an optimal education.
"There are four well-recognized mainstreaming models that can be employed for
teaching handicapped children in the "least restrictive environment." They include: the
Systematic Instructional Model, the North Sacramento Project, Data Based Instruction,
and A Regular Classroom Approach to Special Education.
The Systematic Instructional Model involved six sequential steps: (1) initial assessment
(discovering what the child can and cannot do); (2) determining objectives and sequences
(deciding what to teach); (3) selection of instructional activities (how to teach); (4) ongoing
assessment (how to evaluate the child's performance); (5) program modifications; and (6)
implementation (getting the program to work). S. LOWENBRAUN & J. AFFLECK. TEACHING
MILDLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN REGULAR CLASSES 15-111 (1976).
The North Sacramento Project put the handicapped children into regular classrooms.
With the help of aides and their peers, the handicapped children made gains of over 1 year
on the average in basic skills subjects-in the first half-year of mainstreaming. The Project
emphasized positive reinforcement. K. BEERY. MODELS FOR MAINSTREAMING 81-88 (1972).
Data Based Instruction is an individual program modification system. The handicapped
child's personal educational program is continually evaluated according to the child's
periodic test results. The child's program has the same curriculum objectives as the
regular class. S. DENO & P. MIRKIN. BASIC PROCEDURES IN DATA BASED INSTRUCTION 2-45
(1974) (Special Education Project, USOE #0-71-4155-603).
A Regular Classroom Approach to Special Education entails the instruction of regular
classroom teachers by consulting teachers. The regular classroom teacher learns to apply
behavior analysis and individualized instruction procedures when teaching the moderately
handicapped child. Fox, Egner, Paolucci, Perelman, McKenzie & Garvin, An Introduction
to a Regular Classroom Approach to Special Education, INSTRUCTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 22-43 (E. Deno ed. 1973).
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that the one-way traffic of sending handicapped children to special
classes or schools was difficult to reverse because regular education had
not been changing to adapt for children who learn quite differently.
Handicapped children who were placed back into regular classrooms, or
just left there because they were never identified, floundered in the tradi
tional undifferentiated curriculums and teaching methodology. Resource
rooms, taught by special education teachers, quickly became the part-
time special classes for these children so they would not fail entirely in
the educational process. The children could have "special instruction" by
being scheduled for certain periods during the school day and then being
placed in the mainstream of regular education for the remainder of the
day. Thus, the "pull-out" and "fix-up" philosophy was being continued.
In the large majority of cases the special education resource teacher
never became involved in instructional programing and team-teaching
for handicapped children in the mainstream of regular education. On the
whole, this situation continues to this day.
This article is concerned with how federal law can foster the ap-
propriate mainstreaming of handicapped children in the public school
system. Already close to 50 percent of the nearly 8 million handicapped
children have been placed in regular classrooms for a sizeable portion of
their education. 13 Since Public Law No. 94-142 mandates the "least
restrictive environment" and school systems must provide proof for any
segregation of handicapped children, administrators will no doubt be
more inclined to place handicapped children in the mainstream. The
enigma is that handicapped children are being ushered back into the
mainstream without appropriate preparation for them in the regular
classroom. Commonly their individualized educational programs do not
even provide a framework for measuring the children's success in their
new educational environments.
The problem lies in the failure of school officials to properly effectuate
mainstreaming as mandated by federal law, thereby denying the hand-
icapped child's civil right to a free, appropriate public education. We will
address the problem as it relates to requirements in existing law, assess
the status of educational and legal knowledge, set forth the practical pro-
blems of implementation, and make our suggestions for resolution of the
problem.-
"Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35 EXCEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968). See generally N. HARING & R. SCHIEFLEBUSH. METHODS IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION (1967); Quay, The Facets of Educational Exceptionality: A Concep-
tual Framework for Assessment, Grouping and Instruction, 35 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
25-31 (1968); M. Reynolds, Categories and Variables in Special Education (1966)(paper
presented to USOE/CEC Conference on Special Education, University of Maryland).
This statistic is documented in W. TICE ET AL.. MAINSTREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS
MEET THE CHALLENGE 34 (1976). See also Deno, Special Education as Developmental
Capita& 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 235 (1970); Reynolds, Framework for Considering
Some Issues in Special Education, 28 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 367 (1962).
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THE PROBLEM
Underlying the provision for a "least restrictive environment" in
Public Law No. 94-142, § 612(5)(B), is the handicapped child's civil right
to receive a free public education like every other child in the United
States. To limit in any way a handicapped child's opportunity to receive
an education equal to his potential is to deny that child's civil right.
1 4
Therefore, it is incumbent upon state and local education agencies to not
demur in fully complying with this basic principle in the law.
The primary vehicle used to describe an appropriate education that is
equal to the handicapped child's potential is the individualized education
program (IEP). This written statement is to clearly set forth the child's
present level of functioning, instructional objectives as related to annual
goals, services needed to educate the child, and a follow-up evaluation to
determine if the instructional objectives have been met. The program
statement should also show the extent to which the child can be educated
with children who are not handicapped and show the method for pro-
graming the child's educational objectives, accompanied by criteria for
measuring his attainment. Thus, the program outlines the least restric-
tive environment. 5
In reality, the IEP becomes the only written agreement between all the
parties involved (child, parent, local educational agency, state agency) to
insure that the handicapped child will be provided with an appropriate
education. Yet this agreement is not a legally binding document and the
state and local educational agencies "[do] not violate these regulations if
the child does not achieve growth projected in the annual goals and objec-
tives. '1 6 This places the onus of whether the handicapped child has had
an appropriate assessment and is receiving an appropriate education on
the parent or surrogate parent, if the handicapped individual is a minor.
This person must judge as to whether the child's civil right is being
safeguarded or violated.
The burden of this position is twofold. First, local educational agency
administrators and professional teams that conduct assessment and in-
structional programing tend to develop IEP's based on existing
resources available in the school districts rather than including specific
services needed for handicapped children without regard to local
availability of such services. Further, there is a tendency to encourage
parents, most of whom do not know what other educational options may
1 The regulations include provisions which are designed (1) to assure that all
handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public educa-
tion; (2) to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents
are protected; (3) to assist states and localities to provide for the education of
handicapped children; and (4) to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts
to educate such children.
42 Fed. Reg. 42,474 (1977).
1542 Fed. Reg. 42,485-86 (1977) (§§ 121a.220-.226).
16id.
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be open to their children, to endorse suggested 1EP's agreed upon by the
assessment/programing teams. While the due process procedures afford
parents the opportunity to obtain independent evaluations at public ex-
pense, the parents usually accept what the school district and its
"specialists" offer. 7 Secondly, even though parents may pursue indepen-
dent evaluations, either at public or their own expense, in order to pro-
vide an appropriate IEP, the local and state educational agencies will not
be placed in jeopardy for not meeting the objectives set forth in the
IEP's, as already indicated. Handicapped children and their parents are
still left at the mercy of the local and state educational agencies.
Hence, this leads to the crucial issue, which is the placing of a han-
dicapped child in the "least restrictive environment" and providing an
appropriate program in the mainstream of regular education, when sug-
gested in the IEP. What can be done to provide quality control of
mainstreaming procedures and to keep local educational agencies from
placing handicapped children into regular education classrooms without
clearly setting forth in the IEP's how the individual objectives, based on
the needs of the children, will be met? And, if quality control is not pro-
vided and objectives are not met, what will occur in order to safeguard
the civil rights of the children?
STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE RELATING TO THE PROBLEM
History of Education Relating to Appropriate Mainstreaming of
Handicapped Children
While many state constitutions have included provisions for free public
education to all children for up to a century, this end has not been fully
reached for children with handicapping conditions.'8 As the compulsory
school attendance laws came into existence, the practice of placing
severely handicapped individuals in state institutions continued while
the mildly handicapped were left to "sink or swim" in regular class set-
tings. With the lack of individualized assessment procedures and
teaching techniques in general education, many of the mildly handicap-
ped children failed in the mainstream. As a result, special classes and
schools for the handicapped developed a half century ago. Special educa-
tion with its special class model for all kinds of handicapping conditions
received a real nudge forward as regular educators were only too happy to
have the "poor learners" removed from their classrooms. So, "special
education as a subsystem of the total education system, responsible for
the joint provision of specialized or adapted programs and services (or for
assisting others to provide such services) for exceptional children and
youth" became a permanent entity in education. 9 With it, however, con-
"42 Fed. Reg. 42,494-96 11977).
'"Melcher, Law, Litigation, and Handicapped Children, 43 EXCErIrONAI. CIIII.DRN 127
(1976).
11B. GEAR1ItEAIRt& M. WEISItAHN. TIlE HANDICAPPED CII IIA) IN TIlE REG(IIIAR CIA.SSROOM
11 (1976).
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tinued the segregationist position, held for centuries in Western culture,
that somehow handicapped individuals are quite different from other
people, as revealed in the approach towards abilities testing, and perhaps
even less human. Thus, the handicapped child rather than the educa-
tional program is at fault for his failure to learn, therefore, this child
needs a different program that will suit the category of the child's handi-
capping disabilities.
Since the turn of the century, public schools have practiced segregating
handicapped children into special classes for instruction . 2 Labeling them
according to handicapping categories (i.e.; visually handicapped, hearing
handicapped, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed) provided a
method whereby these children could be excluded from the mainstream
of regular education and enabled funds to be earmarked for more exten-
sive and expensive education.2 1 Now, upon learning of the potentially
dehumanizing effect of categorizing and segregating handicapped
children in education, regular education is faced with the need for
changes that will provide appropriate education in the mainstream.
Similarly, special education is faced with redefining its role of being a
resource to these children in the mainstream without excessive
categorization and "pull-out" programs.22
With evidence accumulating that questions the efficacy of segregated
programs for the handicapped, professionals and parents alike have call-
ed into question such practices in public schools. 2 3 In allowing special
education to become a "dumping ground" for regular education, unequal
opportunities for the education of the handicapped developed.
As a response, mainstreaming arose to alleviate this inequity. Most
simply, "mainstreaming is the conscientious effort to place handicapped
children into the least restrictive educational setting which is ap-
propriate to their needs. ' 24 It provides services to the handicapped along
a continuum of educational settings based upon the needs of the handi-
capped child.2 5 "As educators focus more carefully on the individual and'
his or her uniqueness, they . . .move away from grouping children
categorically by handicap, away from special schools and special classes,
211d. at 8-11.
IS. LOWENBRAUN & J. AFFLECK. TEACHING MILDLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN REGULAR
CLASSES 2 (1976).22K. BEERY. MODELS FOR MAINSTREAMING 24 (1972).
2'See G. HOELKE. EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIAL CLASS PLACEMENT FOR EDUCABLE MENTAL-
LY RETARDED CHILDREN (1966); S. Kirk, Research in Education, in MENTAL RETARDATION
(H. Stevens & R. Heber eds. 1964); M. Reynolds, Categories and Variables in Special Educa-
tion (1966) (paper presented to USOE/CEC Conference on Special Education, University of
Maryland); Deno, Special Education as Developmental Capital, 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
229-37 (1970); Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?
35 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5-22 (1968); Reynolds & Ballow, Categories and Variables in
Special Education, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 357-66 (1972); Smith & Kennedy, Effects of
Three Educational Programs on Mentally Retarded Children, 24 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR
SKILIS9 174 (1967).
21W. TICE ET AL.. MAINSTREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS MEET THE CHALLENGE 7 (1976).
21Id. at 8.
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and away from other manifestations of the assumptions about
homogeneity.'"6
The educational trend toward mainstreaming is paralleled and sup-
ported by a similar legal trend. Federal, state, and local law provides the
foundation for public education. The interplay between the law and
educational theories determines the character of the child's education.
The present and future provision of public education is better understood
after an examination of public education's historical background and
past treatment of handicapped children.
Legal Treatment and Transition
Although there was the traditional lag between educational theories
and the law necessary to support those theories, the legal structure
adapted to the changing educational structure. 27 When the normal tenure
of a public education expanded, the compulsory school laws also extend-
ed the number of years the American child was required to attend
school.29 The longitudinal growth of public education is now evidenced by
the commonness of public kindergartens and higher education, whether
college or vocational. Furthermore, Public Law No. 94-142 not only
recognizes that some states have public educational programs for the
three to five year old, but it also encourages use of the federal funds for
the handicapped child newborn to two years of age. 29
"6Martin. A National Commitment to the Rights of the Individual-1776 to 1976 43 Ex.
CEPT'iIOL\. CILDREN 135 (1976).2
-L. FIIEDANIN & S. MACAULAY. LAW ,xANID 'niE BVII V,\IOI. SCI:NI'ES 596-97 (1969).
Numerous sociologists have posited that there is a lag between custom or accepted
behavior and the legal system that is meant to support that social structure. One theorist
posited that the lag was one generation, assuming that the new social ideas or societal
system was adopted by youth and not instituted as law until the youth became adults in
positions of power. As Legislators, judges, and bureaucrats they could put their "new"
ideas into action: but of course the youth at that time would have a completely new set of
ideas.
"*The evolution of the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law provides one exam-
ple of the early law. WiS. SWAT. § 118.15 (1975). 1889 Wis. Laws c. 519:1891, c. 187: 1898, §
439(a): 1901, c. 251; 1903. c. 189; Supp. 1906, § 439(a): 1907, c. 446; 1913, c. 773, § 16: 1915.
c. 250, 266: 1915, § 439(a), 439(a)-i; 1917, c. 285: 1917, c. 578, § 2; 1917, c. 674, § 1; 1917, c.
677, § 41: 1917, § 40.73: 1919, c. 679, §§ 26-27. 1921, c. 411, § 1: 1921, c. 513, § 1; 1927, c.
425, § 97; 1927, § 40.70; 1933, c. 143, § 3: 1935, c. 161:1937, c. 40: 1937, c. 349: 1939, c. 193,
493: 1945, c. 120; 1949, c. 96: 1951, c. 38; 1953, c. 90, § 130; 1953, § 40.77: 1955, c. 575, § 1:
1959, c. 548, § 1: 1965, c. 19, § 17: 1965, c. 292, § 2m: 1967, c. 39, §§ 1,2; 1965, § 40.77; 1967,
c. 92, § 17, eff. Jan. 1, 1968; 1967, c. 313, § 18, eff. Jan. 13, 1968; 1969, c. 276, § 589, eff. Dec.
28, 1969; 1969, c. 344. eff. Feb. 1, 1970: 1969, c. 501, § 7. eff. July 1. 1970; 1971, c. 40, § 61:
1971, c. 125, § 451, eff. Nov. 5, 1971; 1971, c. 154, § 56(m), eff. July 1, 1972; 1973, c. 319, eff.
July 3, 1974 (created subsection 4(m)); 1973, c. 89, § 6, eff. Aug. 9, 1973; 1973, c. 243, § 53,
eff. June 7, 1974 (amended subsection 3(b)); 1973, c. 89, § 6, eff. Aug. 9, 1973 (amended
subsections 3(a)(2)., 3.): 1975, c. 39, § 601, eff. July 31, 1975: 1975, c. 199, § 287, eff. Apr. 15,
1976 (amended subsection 1(e)); 1973, c. 332, eff. July 3, 1974 (created subsection 1(e)):
1975, c. 39, § 600, eff. July 31, 1975; 1975. c. 199, § 286, eff. Apr. 15. 1976 (amended subsec-
tions 1(a), (b)). See also McDonald, Compulsory Public SchoolAttendance, 7 MAIIQ. L. REv.
96 (1923); Roach, Education for Children with Exceptional Needs, 34 Gavel 15 (No. 2,
1973-74); Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance, 1971 Wis. L. REv.
832.2
'Emphasis is on handicapped children aged 3 to 21, thus allowing use of federal funds
for early childhood programs and the young adult who may still be seeking public educa-
tion. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. 1975);
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During the century of longitudinal growth there was a simultaneous
[A] free appropriate public education will be available for all handicapped
children between the ages of 3 and 18 within the State not later than
September 1, 1978, and for all handicapped children between the ages of 3 and
21 within the State not later than September 1, 1980, except that, with
respect to handicapped children aged 3 to 5 and aged 18 to 21, inclusive, the
requirements of this clause shall not be applied in any State if the application
of such requirements would be inconsistent with State law or practice, or the
order of any court, respecting public education within such age groups in the
State.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. 1975).
Section 4(A) of Senate Report No. 94-168 sets out the entitlement formula. S. REF'. No.
94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975). Section 4(B) establishes eligibility and the respec-
tive age requirements:
Thus, the Committee bill provides that a State, in order to be eligible for fun-
ding, must have a "right to education" policy for all handicapped children,
that all handicapped children aged three to twenty-one will have available to
them by September 1. 1980, a free appropriate public education. With respect
to handicapped children, aged three to five and aged eighteen to twenty-one,
inclusive, the Committee bill provides that such requirement shall not be ap-
plied in any State if the application of such requirement would be inconsistent
with State law or practice, or the order of any court, respecting public educa-
tion within such age groups in the State.
Id. at 3. The 3 to 21 span is followed in the classification procedures, also. "(1) A limitation
is established on the number of children a State may count for purposes of the entitlement.
This limitation has been set at 10 percent of a State's population of all children aged three
to twenty-one.'" Id at 28. See also id. at 50.
Not all the legislators agreed that the extended age span for public education should be
discretionary with the states.
According to information the Committee has received, 35 states have laws
which provide services to children with handicaps at an age less than six
years old. There are 15 states and the District of Columbia then where ser-
vices are -tot required for at least some group of handicapped children below
school age, but even some of these states have laws which permit such ser-
vices to such handicapped children.
The bill as reported to the full Committee from the Subcommittee on the
Handicapped provided for such services to the age group 3 to 5 years of age.
As reported to the full Committee, S. 6 reflected the commitment to service
for preschool children that was adopted in P.L. 93-380 last year. This position
was consistent with present law.
Therefore, we do not agree with the full committee action which makes such
service permissive for those states who are not providing services or whose
laws prohibit or do not authorize the provision of such services. We think that
the action taken by the Committee unwisely moves the Congress away from
the policy in present law which emphasizes the earliest possible service to
handicapped children.
Id at 81-82 (Additional Views of Senators Stafford, Javits, Kennedy, Schweiker, and
Hathaway). It is true that early childhood education can be particularly important for the
handicapped child. The last paragraph above hints at the potential the federal government
has for coercing states to change their laws and educational programs to provide education
to three to five year-olds. By refusing to grant money to states that don't authorize or that
prohibit public education to handicapped children aged three to five, the desire to obtain
the federal money may in effect coerce the states into changing those laws. However,
limiting eligibility in that way would be an educated gamble. The federal government
would be risking the educations of older handicapped children. If a state did not want to
extend education to handicapped children aged three to five, the federal government would
not be able to grant money to the state at all, depriving the older children of the benefits of
federal monies. Even if the state chose to change its relevant laws, the time lag during the
change would also cause fiscal and educational deprivation. It is not likely that a state
would be able to change its laws fast enough to meet the September 1, 1978, and
September 1, 1980 deadlines.
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latitudinal growth. 0 The three "R's" were accompanied by more diverse
programs, such as industrial arts, home economics, foreign languages,
music, and physical education. Around this same period the segregated
special education programs started. Whereas there were compulsory
education laws for the amount of time the normal child had to attend
school, the handicapped were commonly exempt from compulsory atten-
dance.3 ' The special consideration appeared to be a privilege. However,
its practical effect was to relieve the state from having to provide special
education of specified duration 32 or quality. Because facilities were inade-
quate for instructing the severely or multiply handicapped, those handi-
capped children sometimes received residentia 3 3 or home instruction, but
Thus, in passing the Senate bill in lieu of the House bill, the timetable was established as
follows:
Timetable. The Senate bill requires that the State, in order to be eligible for
assistance, submit a plan as required by the Education Amendments of 1974,
and that such plan be amended setting forth in detail the policies and pro-
cedures the State will undertake or has undertaken to assure that a free ap-
propriate public education will be available to all handicapped children be-
tween the ages of 3 and 18 within the State not later than September 1, 1978,
and that a free appropriate public education will be available to all handi-
capped children between the ages of 3 and 21 within the State not later than
September 1, 1980. The Senate bill further provides that with respect to
handicapped children aged three to five and eighteen to twenty-one, inclusive,
that the requirement of providing a free appropriate education in accordance
with this timetable, shall not be applied in any State if that application would
be inconsistent with State law or practice or the order of any court respecting
the public education within such age groups in the State.
The House amendments provided that a State must submit a State plan
which shall assur6 that funds will be expended to initiate, expand, or improve
programs which are designed to assure that after September 30, 1978, no
handicapped child residing in the State shall be denied appropriate special
education and related services.
The House Amendments provide that the requirement applies to any
handicapped child who is within an age group for which free public education
is provided within the State.
The House recedes.
Id at 36-37.
3
""Longitudinal" denoting the number of years the child was required to attend school;
"latitudinal" denoting the spectrum of subjects taught to the child. Necessarily some of
the courses became options, but the variety of educational topics available continued to
broaden the educational opportunity.31Although statutes did not bar the handicapped from public classrooms, unless they
would disrupt the class activities, they commonly made attendance a matter of parental
discretion. The common exception from compulsory attendance applied to handicapped
children referred to a "physical or mental condition" that made attendance "inexpedient
or impracticable." 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 93, § 21. See also 1921 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
215, § 75 1/2 (child's bodily or mental condition does not permit its attendance at school");
1912 Ky. Acts, ch. 113, § 4521a ("shown to the satisfaction of the county superintendent of
schools that such child is not in proper physical or mental condition to attend school");
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 5979(c) (1915) (physically unable to attend).
Upon establishing institutions for the blind, deaf, and dumb, states made attendance at
those institutions either compulsory or discretionary. See, e.g., 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch.
93, §21 (parents fined for nonattendance at school for deaf and blind); GA. CODE ANN. §1429
(Park's 1914) ("the parent or guardian of any deaf and dumb mute, or semi-mute, shall be
permitted, if they so desire, to send such child to the State Institute for the deaf and
dumb .... ); MICH. COMP. LAWS §5986 (1915) (compulsory education of the deaf if can't be
taught successfully in the public schools), MICH. COMP. LAWS §5988 (1915) (compulsory
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severely or multiply handicapped, those handicapped children sometimes
usually received none at all. Even if the child could have managed in the
special education class environment, the problem of transportation com-
monly blocked the child's access to education. Because special education
was not compulsory, whether the handicapped child received the educa-
tion was a matter of parental discretion. Unfortunately the discretion
commonly resulted in what was easiest for the parent, rather than what
was best for the child. Thus the state's failure to compel special education
attendance not only relieved it of providing a special education program
of satisfactory time and type, but it also reduced the number of students
in the special education category.3 4 This reduced the costs of special
education to the state, although it increased the costs of welfare and lost
economic input associated with not educating the handicapped.3 5 The
absence of compulsory school laws for the handicapped also indirectly
established the legislative priorities of the state. Since the normal child
was required to attend school, the required education had to be available.
education of deaf shall be enforced like other compulsory education), MICH. CoMIP. LAWS
§1476(b) (1915) (in the case of "children whose vision is so defective as to make it impossi-
ble to properly educate them in the schools," their education in a school for the blind is
compulsory unless they are "(2) physically or mentally incompetent of being educated"),
MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 1856-77 (1882) (Michigan School for the Blind), MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
1836-55 (1882) (The Michigan Institution for Educating the Deaf and Dumb). It is in-
teresting to note that the age span for school attendance was different for the handicapped
and normal students. See e.g., 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 93, § 21 (8-16 for normal students;
6-18 for the deaf and blind); MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 1476(b), 5979(c), 5986 (1915) (7-16 for nor-
mal students; 7-18 for deaf students; 7-19 for blind students). See note 35 infr-
"
2 See discussion in note 31, supr. Prior to the establishment of special schools for the
handicapped, if parents or teachers thought the handicapped student had gleaned all that
was possible from the public school, the student was no longer required to attend. The
educational goals for teaching the handicapped were commonly much lower than for nor-
mal students. The aim was to teach them the basics so that they could be somewhat self-
sufficient. The more abstract, intellectual, and advanced subjects were not considered very
useful to the handicapped student. As for the mentally handicapped student, if he fell
behind and therefore quit learning, the school had taught him all it could.
33Residential" here means institutionalized instruction, where the handicapped student
would live at the school.
31To this day, not all handicapped children receive a proper public education. The trend is
one of a recent, progressive surge of educational services for the handicapped. U.S. Office
of Education studies show that in 1948 only 12 percent of handicapped children received
special education. In 1963 the figure was up to 21 percent, in 1967 it had risen to 33 per-
cent, and by 1971 it was approximately 40 percent. F. Weintraub, A. Abeson & D. Brad-
dock, State Law and Education of Handicapped Children: Issues and Recommendations,
14 (1971). By the 1974-75 year, 55 percent of school-aged handicapped children were being
served, but that was still 45 percent away from the absolutes set by the Education fbr All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975. S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
35 The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and
taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals
to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable
lifestyle. [See id for statistics.] With proper education services, many would
be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being
forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their
independence, thus reducing their dependence on society.
There is no pride in being forced to receive economic assistance. Not only
does this have negative effects upon the handicapped person, but it has far-
reaching effects for such person's family.
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Therefore, the legislature could easily rationalize that regular education
had priority over special education.
In 1972 there was a major turning point. Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education
established the handicapped child's right to an education, proclaiming
the "privileged" exemptions to be void as a matter of equal protection.3 6
Providing educational services will ensure against persons needlessly being
forced into institutional settings. One need only look at public residential in-
stitutions to find thousands of persons whose families are no longer able to
care for them and who themselves have received no educational services.
Billions of dollars are expended each year to maintain persons in these
subhuman conditions.
S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975).
Thus, providing educational services to the handicapped will decrease the welfare rolls,
will decrease the need for institutional care, will relieve the immediate family of an over-
whelming financial burden, and will allow the handicapped person to maintain a sense of
pride.
Without appropriate educational opportunity, many handicapped children
would remain an economic liability to the state. As productive citizens,
however, they can become both economic and social contributors to the na-
tion. It has been estimated that one million handicapped children have not
received educational opportunities due to provisions in compulsory school at-
tendance laws which exclude them from public education. Exclusion clauses
of this type in state laws raise serious moral questions. However, from a pure
economic perspective, 90 percent of handicapped children with appropriate
education can become tax paying citizens. It has been estimated that each
handicapped child that receives an appropriate education is worth at least a
quarter of a million dollars to society: half in reduced welfare and institutional
costs and half in increased productivity.
Handicapped Children's Education Project, A Summary of Issues and State Legislation
Related to the Education of Handicapped Children in 1972, at 1 (1973) (Report No. 36 of
the Education Commission of the States; footnote omitted).3
6Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972), was the first decision to discuss the handicapped child's right to a public
education. Actually, the only decision left to the three-judge federal district court was
whether to approve the consent agreement and stipulation. The plaintiffs were so suc-
cessful in their thorough presentation of evidence in the hearings, including testimony
from nationally recognized experts in the field, that the defendants pushed for the consent
agreement. The plaintiffs in the class action suit got essentially everything they wanted,
but the defendants were afraid that the court would be even more "generous" than they
were.
The source of the complaint was the total exclusion of persons who were categorized as
"uneducable" or "unable to profit" from further education from the public school system.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1330, 13-1375 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79). The Pennsylvania
statutes also allowed the educational exclusion of persons who hadn't reached the mental
age of 5 years or who were not within the compulsory school age span of 8-17. Id § 13-1304,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1326 (Purdon 1972). The solution to the problem was for the
Pennsylvania Attorney General to issue official opinions foreclosing the use of the above
statutes for educational exclusion of mentally handicapped children. The consent agree-
ment stated that Pennsylvania had a legal responsibility to provide a free public program
of education to every child. The state agreed to put each mentally handicapped child in a
"free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity." Penn-
sylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D.
Pa. 1971). Additionally, when the state provided preschool education, it would offer similar
educational opportunities to mentally handicapped children. Id. at 1262. The plaintiffs
would be eligible for tuition grant assistance for private school attendance just as other
disability groups were. Id at 1260.
The consent agreement also provided a strong procedural framework. The state only had
a few months, until September 1, 1972, to identify, evaluate, and place each plaintiff child
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Twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia enacted laws for the
education of the handicapped by 1973, half of those laws being enacted in
in an appropriate educational program. The stipulation required notice and an opportunity
for a due process hearing before a special hearing officer before a mentally handicapped
child could be assigned or reassigned to a regular or special educational placement. The
court also appointed two specialists in the area, a social scientist and an attorney, to be
special masters for the review and approval of the defendants' implementation plan. Id at
1259.
The PARC decision notably touched on the concept of the least restrictive environment.
As a derivative of the legal concept of the least restrictive alternative in this case, the in-
junctive decree stated:
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a
free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's
capacity, within the context of a presumption that, among the alternative
programs of education and training required by statute to be available, place-
ment in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special
public school class and placement in a special public school class is preferable
to placement in any other type of program of education and training.
Id at 1260.
The preference for integrating handicapped children in the regular classroom was echoed
in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.C. 1972):
Each member of the plaintiff class is to be provided with a publicly-supported
educational program suited to his needs, within the context of a presumption
that among the alternative programs of education, placement in a regular
public school class with appropriate ancillary services is preferable to place-
ment in a special school class.
Mills also settled the constitutional questions raised in PARC. One PARC defendant had
challenged the court's jurisdiction. The court found that there was a constitutional claim
under both the due process and equal protection clauses. In regard to the former, the
PARC court relied on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), comparing the
stigma associated with the label "mentally retarded" to the stigma associated with the
public posting that one is a habitual drunkard, as in Constantineau. Before a stigmatic
label can be applied, a hearing is required. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 295. In regard to the
equal protection aspect, the PARC court relied on Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). The court applied the rational basis test, finding that Pennsylvania had no ra-
tional basis for denying public education to some children and not to others. Id at 297. The
Mills court reiterated the constitutional principles and determined that all children were
entitled to a public education, regardless of any disability.
The Mills suit was grounded in the growing percentage of handicapped children who
were not receiving special education. Mentally handicapped and emotionally disturbed
children were commonly excluded from school until "small classes" were available for
them. Such informal and illegal exclusionary tactics kept 1500 children on waiting lists and
an unknown number of others out of the public school system completely. The plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction to get the named plaintiff children in the class action
into classrooms during legal proceedings. The plaintiffs also moved for the production of
lists of excluded children and for an identification effort aimed at discovering what other
children were excluded from public education. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875, 879. Defendants
agreed to the motion's requests prior to its hearing.
As in PARC, the plaintiffs' case was presented thoroughly and with unshakeable expert
testimony. After affidavits, exhibits, memoranda, and oral argument, the judge granted
the plaintiffs a summary judgment. The opinion, judgment, and decree discussed the equal
protection argument and ordered due process in the form of notice and a hearing prior to
suspension or reassignment to or from a special education program. Id at 875. The court
pointed out that institutionalized children were to be protected by the District of Columbia
social services administration, acting as a parent. Id at 876 n.8. Thus, PARC and Mills
declared every child's right to a public education.
See also THE PRESIDENT*S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION. THE MENTALLY RETARD-
ED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 255-67 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer eds. 1976);
L. LIPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG. RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (1973); Comment, Public Instruction to
the Learning Disabled- Higher Hurdles for the Handicapped, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 113,
129-32 (1973-74).
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1972.11 Prior to 1960, only three states had enacted special education
laws and seven more states enacted laws in the 1960's.38 Now all states
have enacted special education laws, indicating that not only is the
legislative attention a movement of the 1970's, but that over half of the
states have taken action since 1972.39
The turning point also resulted in new federal laws for the education of
the handicapped. The first major statement in this regard came in the
Education Amendments of 1974 (Public Law No. 93-380). Title I of
Public Law No. 93-380 amended the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965.40 Specifically, amendments were made in regard to
"Special Education Programs and Projects for Educationally Deprived
Children."'41 This Title dealt with federal grants to be made to state and
local educational agencies between July 1, 1973, and June 30, 1978.42
Subpart 1 emphasized poverty children, while subpart 2 concentrated on
state-operated programs for handicapped children. 43 Part C outfiied the
eligibility and amount criteria for the special grants." Part D also gave
the Commissioner sole responsibility for program evaluation. 45
Title VI, Extension and Revision of Related Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Programs, contained the "Education of the Handi-
capped Amendments of 1974" in Part B.46 The grants specifically for
handicapped educational programs were limited to the number of hand-
"1The states passing laws for education of the handicapped in 1972 included: Idaho, Loui-
siana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. States issuing protective educational
laws before then were: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. It
should be noted that the Pennsylvania law protecting the mentally retarded, passed in
1971-72, was preceded by a 1956 act which still mandates full planning and programing for
all handicapped children. S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1975).
Since PARC and Mills, supra note 36, at least 22 states have had suits filed to enforce
the right of mentally handicapped children to a public education, and several other courts
have followed the precedent of PARC and Mills. Editorial Introduction, The Right to an
Appropriate Free Public Education, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW.
supra note 36, at 251. "Other courts have declined to rule in suits where state legislatures
had recently enacted statutes designed to achieve the same goal." Id3
"The three states enacting special education laws prior to 1960 were: Hawaii (1949); New
Jersey (1954; and Pennsylvania (1956). The states acting in the 1960's were: Connecticut
(1966): Georgia (1968): Illinois (1965); Indiana (1969); Texas (1969); Utah (1969): and Wyom-
ing (1969). S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1975).3 Although all states now have special education laws, some states have not reached
their compliance dates yet (Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, and North Dakota).
As true of most state legislation, the provisions for coverage and the designated ages of
eligibility vary from state to state. Id-
'
0Title I of the Education Amendments of 1974 revised Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241o, 244 (Supp. 1975).
"Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 488-501 (1974).
4220 U.S.C. §§ 241b-241c (Supp. V 1975).
'
3Id. at § 241c-241c-1.
"Id. §§ 241d-11 to 241d-12.
'sI& § 241o.
'
61d. §§ 1402, 1403(b)-(c), 1411-1413.
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icapped children from ages three to twenty-one multiplied by $8.75. 4"
States applying for such grants had to establish procedures and policies
for the identification of all handicapped children in the state and a
timetable for providing full educational opportunities for them all.48
However, there was no follow-up plan to check the application of these
procedures or their success. Even if there were blantant failures to use
the money as the federal government intended, there were no sanctions
for non-compliance in Public Law No. 93-380. 49
November 29, 1975, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, Public Law No. 94-142 (S. 6), was enacted 0 This Act amends the
Education of the Handicapped Act, becoming effective in various
states.51 There are not only extensions in time periods, but also exten-
41d. § 1411 (effective through September 30, 1977). In other sections the age span of 5 to
17 years of age is referred to. The new § 1411 sets the maximum grant amount at:
(a)(1)(A) the number of handicapped children aged three to twenty-one,
inclusive, in such State who are receiving special education and
related services; multiplied by-
(B) (i) 5 per centum, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978,
of the average per pupil expenditure in public elementary and
secondary schools in the United States;
(ii) 10 per centum, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1979, of the average per pupil expenditure in public elementary
and secondary schools in the United States;
(iii) 20 per centum, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1980, of the average per pupil expenditure in public elementary
and secondary schools in the United States;
(iv) 30 per centum, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1981, of the average per pupil expenditure in public elementary
and secondary schools in the United States; and
(v) 40 per centum, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1982, and for each fiscal year thereafter, of the average per
pupil expenditure in public elementary and secondary schools
in the United States;
except that no State shall receive an amount which is less than
the amount which such State received under this subchapter
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977.
It also establishes how the grants are to be distributed and used. Id. §§ 1411(b)(1)-(d). To
some extent this discussion of allocations replaces the former § 1412, which discussed the
allocation of appropriations.
Id. § 1413(b)(1) (effective through September 30, 1977).
19Besides losing the potential benefits of studying the actual results of the different state
plans, the lack of review procedures and sanctions negated the concept of an educational
right for all children. It also meant that a noncomplying state could use its grant for its
own purposes, a freedom not enjoyed by a complying state. If there had been review pro-
cedures and sanctions, funds could have been shifted to complying states so that the best
utility could have been realized from the funds in regard to the goal of providing the best
possible education for the greatest number of handicapped children.
1189 Stat. 773 (1975). Public Law No. 94-142 affects 5 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5331; 20 U.S.C. §§
241a, 241c-1, 402, 1232g, 1401-1420; and 80 Stat. 1027 (1966).5II& Although not all states need to request the funds designated in Public Law No.
94-142, and thus do not have to develop the detection, educational, and review plans out-
lined in the Act, it is a given that the Act creates a right to education for all handicapped
children, which is a statutory outgrowth of the common law initiated in PARC and Mills.
See note 36 supra.
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sions in coverage and expansions in appropriations.5 2 For example, in-
stead of multiplying the number of handicapped children by $8.75 to
figure the state's grant, the number of handicapped children is now
multiplied by $300.00.53 This is a sizeable financial commitment, par-
ticularly since the state's grant will be at least the same amount each
year and is scheduled to progressively increase.5 4 It is intended that the
state and local educational agencies will be matching these amounts and
that the federal monies will be "excess" money to upgrade special educa-
tion to an even further extent.55
52Much criticism has been leveled at Public Law No. 94-142's predecessors because they
covered only a limited amount of time. The temporal limitation simultaneously induced
hurried planning and instant programs on one hand and reluctance to produce any pro-
grams because of the amount of time proper planning would take and the fear that money
would only be designated for the amount of time mentioned in the statutes. Public Law No.
94-142 not only extends the time limitation, but it establishes a time frame that allows
long-range planning. The progressive increases in maximum grant size show a federal com-
mitment to increasing allocations to the states for education of the handicapped. 20 U.S.C.
§ 141 1(a) (Supp. 1975). Although the graduated scale does not guarantee increasing alloca-
tions, it is guaranteed that "no State shall receive an amount which is less than the
amount which such State received under this subchapter for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1977." Id See generally id § 1411.
53The result is the maximum grant the state can receive. 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (Supp. 1975)
reads:
(a) Authority to make grants.
The Commissioner shall make a grant to any State which-
(1) has met the eligibility requirements of section 1412 of
this title;
(2) has a State plan approved under section 1413 of this
title: and
(3) provides special education and related services to hand-
icapped children aged three to five, inclusive, who are
counted for the purposes of section 1411(a)(1)(A) of this
title.
The maximum amount of the grant for each fiscal year which a
State may receive under this section shall be $300 for each child
in that State.
Grants under this subsection support the education of handicapped children aged 3 to 5.
The Senate bill used the $300 figure for calculating the state's entire maximum grant. S.
REP. No. 94-455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1480, 1485-86. The "incentive grants" under subsection (a) above may still be maximum
grants in regard to per-child expenses, but it is possible that the conference substitute for
calculating the total state grant could supply even more than $300 per child. See note 47
supra.5 The state's base amount is the size of the grant received for "Assistance for Education
of All Handicapped Children" for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977. The state is
entitled to larger future grants. See note 47 supra.
SSection 1411(c)(2)(B) of Title 20 in the United States Code reads:
The amount expended by any State from the funds available to such State
under paragraph (1)(A) in any fiscal year for the provision of support services
or for the provision of direct services shall be matched on a program basis by
such State, from funds other than Federal funds, for the provision of support
services or for the provision of direct services for the fiscal year involved.
Section 1413(a)(9) of Title 20 requires a state plan to:
provide satisfactory assurance that Federal funds made available under this
subchapter (A) will not be commingled with State funds, and (B) will be so
used as to supplement and increase the level of State and local funds expend-
ed for the education of handicapped children and in no case to supplant such
State and local funds, except that, where the State provides clear and convin-
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Besides meeting the financial problems special education programs
have perpetually had, the Act eradicates other barriers. It proclaims the
handicapped person's right to a public education, thereby forcing every
state to provide the handicapped person with an education equivalent to
the regular education. Admittedly a special education costs the state
twice as much to provide on the average, but the Act alleviates some of
the financial sting of this federal coercion by providing $300.00 per hand-
icapped child, which is equivalent to one-fourth of the extra expense. 6
cing evidence that all handicapped children have available to them a free ap-
propriate public education, the Commissioner may waive in part the require-
ment of this clause if he concurs with the evidence provided by the State[.]
These provisions maximize the total amount spent on the public education of the handi-
capped. Section 1411 also controls the distribution and use of the federal grants, specify-
ing what percentage and dollar amounts can be spent for administration, state use, local
educational agency use, and intermediate educational unit use. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(b)-(d)
(Supp. 1975).
5 Costs of appropriate educational services for handicapped children
are more expensive as compared with those of educating other
children. While cost data often vary from study to study, Rossmiller
(1970) reported that the cost of programs for the education of hand-
icapped children ranges from the cost of educating a speech hand-
icapped child, which is 1.8 times the cost of educating a normal child,
to 3.64 for the education of a physically handicapped child. Factors
relating to such high costs are primarily due to lower teacher-pupil
ratios, ancillary personnel, transportation, and demographic factors
such as rural areas where few numbers of handicapped children in-
creases the per pupil costs of equipment and facilities. Rossmiller et.
[sic] al., (1970) using their cost indices, project a minimum 1980 ex-
penditure of about seven billion dollars to provide education to all
handicapped children from ages 5 to 17. Projections for total educa-
tional expenditures in 1980-81 are 64 billion dollars.
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN'S EDUCATION PROJECT. A SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND STATE LEGISIA-
TION RELATED TO THE EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN 1972, at 32 (1973).
Studies done by the National Education Finance Project estimated that the
actual cost of educating a handicapped child is on the average, double the cost
of educating a non-handicapped child. While this estimate may vary by State,
the dollar level of $300 in the Committee bill represents an amount approx-
imately equal to 25 percent of such additional cost, and will provide an
amount per handicapped child which will assist States and local educational
agencies in providing appropriate education for handicapped children.
S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in [19751 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1425, 1439. Because legislative history reveals no intention that the revised funding
scheme would provide a substantially different amount of federal funding, one can conjec-
ture that the federal government still intends to provide a quarter of the additional cost for
educating a handicapped child. See note 47 supra. Plus the $300 figure still applies to early
childhood education under Public Law No. 94-142. 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (Supp. 1975).
Recalling recent litigation about whether the state must assure each child of an educa-
tion costing the same amount or being of equal value to that of any other child in the state,
one can question whether there is equal protection of the law when more public funds are
spent on a handicapped child's education than on the average child's education. This
equal protection challenge is answered by the Act's own guarantee: to assure equal protec-
tion of the law, each child must be provided with a free appropriate public education.
Because such provision costs more in the case of a handicapped child, more public funds
must be spent to meet the statutory, constitutional requirement of a mimimum education.
Rather than looking at the amount spent on each child, one must look at the fact that each
child, whether handicapped or average, is getting the same commodity from the
government-a public education for the same period of time. And arguendo. the average
child is more likely to learn more during that period and to take advantage of publicly pro-
vided and publicly supported education beyond compulsory school years.
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The Act also eliminates parental discretion, making special education
compulsory. 7 The Act's remedial clauses are adequate tools to remove
transportation and architectural barriers.
The Act adds some significant substantive components to the federal
approach. The states still have to present plans before receiving special
education grants. However, now the federal statute establishes general
goals. 59 The state first must present a plan for identifying all handi-
capped children and all federal monies must initially be used to meet that
goal. 60 Then the state can move on to the second priority--making sure
that each of those children receives an appropriate education.'1 Thus,
first priority children are those handicapped children who are unident-
ified and are not receiving a public education. Second priority children
are those handicapped children who are identified but are not receiving
an adequate public education.
Another innovation is to require a planning conference between the
"experts" and the parents.6 2 As mentioned earlier, this conference yields
the individualized educational program.6 3 One crucial aspect of the plan is
"A corollary of a handicapped child's right to a free appropriate public education and the
state's statutory requirement that it be provided is the parental duty to see that the child
receives the education. Now all parents must send their children to school or accept home
tutoring during the compulsory school years, as defined by the state. See notes 31-32
supra. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (Supp. 1975).
" 20 U.S.C. § 1406 (Supp. 1975) (grants for removal of architectural barriers; authoriza-
tion for appropriations); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,479 (1977) (§ 121a.13(a)) (definition of "related ser-
vices" includes transportation).
1920 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. 1975).
0
"First priority children" are handicapped children who have not been identified and are
not receiving a education. Id § 1412(3). The proposed federal rules required the state and
local educational agencies to use funding for first priority children before it could be used
for second priority children or inservice training. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,985 (1976) (§
121a.210-.214). All first priority children had to be identified and provided with a free ap-
propriate public education before funds could be applied elsewhere. Id There was an ob-
vious gap of criteria for determining when the unknown number of children had been ident-
ified and for evaluating the thoroughness and effectiveness of "child find" efforts. The new
rules mitigate this "Catch-22" by setting a September 1, 1978 time limit on finding first
priority children, although efforts to identify, locate, and evaluate all handicapped children
will continue after that date. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,489 (1977) (§ 121a.320-Note). The new rules
also softened the requirement that first priority children must have a free appropriate
education before funding is shifted; now an "interim program of services" for the first
priority child is sufficient if a major component of the child's proposed education program
is not available during the 1977-78 school year. Id. (§ 121a.322).
"Second priority children" are handicapped children who have been identified but who
are receiving an inadequate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3); 42 Fed. Reg. 42.489 (1977) (§
121a.320{b)). These children must be provided with an adequate education by September 1.
1978, so that their respective states can obtain continued funding for the 1979 fiscal year.
See generally 42 Fed. Reg. 42,482, 42,485-86, 42,488-90 (1977) (§§ 121a.127-.128,
.220-.225_ .300-.324). Stadtmueller, Highlights from P.L. 94-142, 18 BuRAU MENIORANDUMI
16, 16 (1977) (publication of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction) (discussion
of priorities).
6I1d.
6220 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1412(2)(B), (4). (6), 1414(a)(1) (C)(iii). (a)(5) (Supp. 1975): 42 Fed.
Reg. 42,486, 42,490-91 (§ 121a.226, .343-.345).
"
3See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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that it must place the child in the least restrictive environment. The third
substantive innovation is a mechanism to supervise the use of the grant,
to compel proper development and application of the IEP, and to force
compliance with the intentions of the Act.
6 4
Thus the federal and state legislatures embodied the evolving ap-
proaches to special education. The new federal statute recognizes the
need for considerable funding, the need for uniform priorities, the educa-
tional desirability of mainstreaming, and the need for an enforcement
mechanism.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
General Problems
Public Law No. 94-142 is not all-encompassing, however. It outlines the
criteria for eligibility, distribution of appropriation, due process and en-
forcement mechanisms, and the appropriate general education theories,
but it doesn't contain substantive details. Despite the statute's com-
prehensive approach, it still leaves the bulk of implementation decisions
to be enunciated by the Office of Education in the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in the Federal Register,65 by the educational
agencies, and by the courts. General pronouncements are the norm for
legislatures, allowing the experts close to the problem to establish the
best substantive rules. There is also the advantage that as educational
theories evolve, the relevant rules can be easily adapted. But such flex-
ibility can have negative effects. Due to state control, procedures will not
be uniform across the country. A local educational agency may have to
meet far higher standards and follow stricter procedures when obtaining,
retaining, and using federal funds than an agency in another state. Fur-
thermore, the state educational policy is subject to political change, par-
ticularly when there is a change in personnel. Different personnel will
believe in different educational theories and will have different ideas
about their implementation. These criticisms apply to the courts and the
HEW Office of Education.
6 4The weight of responsibility falls primarily on the state educational agency. One way
the federal government commands compliance is by requiring detailed planning, which
theoretically starts in the schools and local school systems and culminates in the state's
annual program plan. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,480-85 (1977) (§§ 121a.110-.194). The annual program
plan requires extensive certification and statistical information, timetables, and plans for
the use of facilities, staff, and present and requested funding. Id. The state has con-
siderable control in regard to the plan it adopts, but the adoption process is even federally
prescribed. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(7) (Supp. 1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,487 (1977) (§§ 121a.280-.284).
A state must at least go through the motions of notifying the public of the proposed plan
and receiving public comment.
The parts of the Act governing the individualized education program also place respon-
sibility on the state. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,490-91 (1977) (§§ 121a.341-.345). The HEW Office of
Education in turn divides the responsibility among public agencies. Id. (§§ 121a.341-.349).
This decentralization is not intended to diminish the responsibility or accountability,
though, and the statute and regulations use terms of compulsion, such as "shall" and
"must." Id. These words are backed up by the due process procedures. ICE 42,494-97 (88
121a.500-.534).
620 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. 1975).
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Uncertainty as to the rules will result not only from the inherent flex-
ibility of the statute, but also from the amount of time it will take before
the Office of Education, the educational agencies, and the courts develop
stable guidelines. Unless the Act is amended, the time span of the Act
will elapse before the stabilization is complete.
Meeting the Priorities
The first substantive innovation, established priorities, provides the
first example of the statute's substance gap. The rules presented in the
Federal Register reiterate the priorities and explain that the first priori-
ty, identifying all handicapped children, must be totally completed before
funds can be used for the second priority, assuring each of those children
of an appropriate public education.66 However, no criteria are suggested
for determining whether the first priority has been met. Neither are any
suggestions made about which methods are approved for going about the
search. Obviously every method would be used simultaneously and con-
tinuously to achieve the maximum effectiveness. Because indentification
canvassing is a new educational development, there are no scientific
studies giving the best methods according to experience.6 7 Yet as a prac-
tical matter it is apparent that using all possible methods will result in
duplication of effort or overlap, a case of diminishing marginal returns.6 8
Likewise, it is unknown how long efforts must continue before the first
priority is accomplished. If the identification canvass must be 100 per-
cent effective, the agency may never get to the second priority. Again,
this is a consideration in the most efficient use of limited funds.
The state educational agency has the power of decision in regard to
whether the heeds of first priority children have been met.69 The local
educational agency must prove to the state agency that the first priority
requirement is met before funds can be used for second priority
children.7 0 This area of state discretion raises some interesting equal pro-
66See note 60 supra. Although the new rules soften the impact of the preference given to
first priority children, when the state and local education agencies can shift funding to sec-
ond priority children and teacher training programs is still an unsettled matter. Until
September 1, 1978, an "interim program of services" is allowed for a first priority child
when a trained teacher is not available. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,489-90 (1977) (§§ 121a.321-.324).
After assuring the child of the interim program, Part B funds can be used for teacher train-
ing or other support services. Id (Comments). The underlying theory is that the funds' use
will facilitate and speed up the providing of a free appropriate public education to that
child.
"Present reliance is on mass media. Since children in school who are not receiving an ap-
propriate education are by definition second priority children, first priority children would
be the "closet and attic cases." For this reason public advertising is appropriate and pro-
bably most effective. "Child find" projects are presently being conducted across the
United States. See Stadtmueller, Highlights from P.L. 94-142, 18 BUREAU MEMORANDUM
16, 18 (1977).68There was similar duplication of efforts in the cases pressing for the handicapped
child's right to a public education. See notes 36-37 supra.
£942 Fed. Reg. 42,490 (1977) (§ 121a.324). See also notes 60 and 66 supra.
"°Section 121a.324 reads:
A local educational agency may use funds provided under Part B of the Act
for second priority children, if it provides assurance satisfactory to the State
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tection arguments, since some states may require less proof of first
priority efforts.7 ' The discrepancy could result in a handicapped child not
being "found" in one state, whereas he would have been discovered in
another. On the other hand, the latter state would probably be expending
more funds on second priority children than the first state, raising a
related equal protection problem. Similarly, a state could allow expen-
ditures on second priority children in one school district before such ex-
penditures would be made on similarly situated or needy children in
another school district.
Planning the IEP
The IEP is useful simply because it concentrates affected individuals'
attention on the child's education and development. However, it has
variable utility, depending upon the empirical basis and thought behind
it, the detail of the plan, and the personal characteristics of the persons
attending the meetings for determination and revision of the plan.
Both the Act and the federal rules are vague when discussing the IEP's
content.72 The meeting must establish goals and the means to objectively
assess the progress toward those goals at a later date.7 3 These general re-
quirements lend themselves to a mere listing of subskills that should be
acquired during a year's span.7 4 There is no requirement that the IEP
spell out the progress of the child with an assessment as to whether that
progress is appropriate for him as an individual. Neither is there a re-
quirement that the child's progress be evaluated in relation to the
school's curriculum. It is feasible that the child could acquire the named
subskills but be totally behind in the respective curriculum. This gap is
one of the side effects of inappropriate mainstreaming. The IEP couched
in general terms and ignoring the regular curriculum in devising the in-
dividual child's plan fosters inappropriate mainstreaming. Inappropriate
mainstreaming thus bars the child from a free appropriate education.
The characteristics of the individuals attending the IEP meeting may
educational agency in its application (or an amendment to its application):
(a) That all first priority children have a free appropriate public education
available to them:
(b) That the local educational agency has a system for the identification,
location, and evaluation of handicapped children, as described in its applica-
tion: and
(c) That whenever a first priority child is identified, located and evaluated,
the local educational agency makes available a free appropriate public educa-
tion to the child.
42 Fed. Reg. 42,490 (1977).
"The equal protection issues are similar to those in the cases analyzing the use of proper-
ty taxes for educational funding. Some states, like Wisconsin, have considered the ques-
tion of whether the same amount must be spent on each public school student in the state.
"20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19); 1412(2)(B), (4), (6); 1414(a)(5) (Supp. 1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,491
(1977) (§ 121a.346).
73d.
"Generally worded IEP's are already common in Wisconsin and other states. Part of the
generality may be due to the newness of the concept and procedure, part may be due to the
quantity of IEP's that must be done in a given period of time, and part may be due to the
fact that it's the "path of least resistance" and it lessens the chance that the teacher will
be unable to help the child reach a higher or more specific educational goal. If the IEP
becomes merely a bureaucratic excercise, it should be dispensed with.
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also frustrate the purpose of the IEP. The meeting may include just a
representative of the public agency, the child's teacher, and a parent."5
The representative could easily be the teacher's supervisor or superior.7 6
Therefore, the representative would be prone to "rubber stamp"
whatever the teacher proposes. This is true not only because of possible
bias, but the mere fact that they work together means they are used to
following the same procedures and they probably rely on similar educa-
tional philosophies. In such a meeting, the parent is the only person "on
the other side." Yet the parent probably does not know how to evaluate
the proposed plan. Two experts wield unlimited power in a conference
with a regular citizen. Analogizing to the market situation, it would be an
unfair imbalance to require a bargaining session between two diamond
experts and an engaged man and to assume that the right price would be
set with the man getting the most for his money and getting legitimate
goods. Here the Act and federal rules assume that the parent will repre-
sent his child's interest, assuring the child that the best individualized
plan for a free appropriate education will be obtained. The parent's
capability in this regard is questionable. The Office of Education ap-
parently relies on the public agency representative's and the teacher's
professionalism and attempted objectivity to mitigate the expert-parent
imbalance.
Forcing Compliance
The Act and federal rules are replete with pronouncements of what
state and local educational agencies must do.77 If in fact the local educa-
tional agency does not provide the child with an appropriate education,
the state agency can refuse to award funding to the local agency. 8 That
refusal must be accompanied by direct service by the state, whereby the
state takes on the local agency's responsibility for the provision of ap-
propriate education for the handicapped.79 Needless to say, the state will
make every effort to gain compliance by the local agency before usurping
its function. That reluctance serves a functional purpose, since it is best
to have continuous program administration on the local level. A layer of
supervision and objectivity in funding would be lost if the state agency
assumed the role of the local agency, since taking on the local agency's
5 ther potential attendants are the other parent, the child, and other individuals at the
discretion of the parent or the agency. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,490 (1977) (§ 121a.344):S(b)Evaluation personneL For a handicapped child who has been evaluated
for the first time, the public agency shall insure:
(1)That a member of the evaluation team participates in the meeting; or
(2)That the representative of the public agency, the child's teacher, or
some other person is present at the meeting, who is knowledgeable about the
evaluation procedures used with the child and is familiar with the results of
the evaluation.7 The supervisor would be the most convenient representative of the public agency. The
representative could even be an appointed equal or colleague of the teacher. Section
121a.344 merely requires: "[a](1) A representative of the public agency, other than the
child's teacher, who is qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, special
education." 42 Fed. Reg. 42,490 (1977).
"See note 64 supra.
'842 Fed. Reg. 42,491 (1977) (§ 121a.360(a(3)).
7gI9d
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duties would overburden the state agency. However, that reluctance also
makes the state agency prone to overlooking ways that a local agency
should improve the commodity it provides to handicapped students. And
in the event of noncompliance with state agency directives or requests,
the agency may hesitate to take coercive action.
Another factor militating against state enforcement is the desire to get
as much funding from the federal government as possible. The more
children the state characterizes as being "served," the more funding the
state receives. The result is state error on the side of leniency.
Specific Mainstreaming Problems
It is equally easy for the state to conclude that because handicapped
students are in the regular classroom they are "mainstreamed." The
state will have to rely on the local educational agency's claimed figures of
its mainstreaming, unless the state develops independent means of
assessment. For example, the state would have to require and evaluate an
excessive amount of paperwork from the local agency or it would have to
do substantial field supervision; both are cumbersome alternatives. 0
Thus the local educational entities will bear the responsibility for ap-
propriate determination and provision of the "least restrictive environ-
ment."8 '
The implementation of the least restrictive environment requirement is
easier than it would have been under the proposed federal rules. Whereas
the proposed rules required the IEP to outline the specific educational
services needed by the child, irrespective of their availability, the new
rules allow the IEP's limitation to services available and no attempt
must be made to supply new services.
82
The most common service relied upon is the resource room. Yet a
resource room is inadequate if its instruction does not coordinate with
that in the regular classroom and if the handicapped student feels lost in
the regular curriculum. 3 There are no immediate sanctions to protect the
"The state has the freedom to require the local educational agency to file whatever infor-
mation it needs. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,485-87 (1977) (§§ 121a.193, .232).
8 1M. Barry, The Role of the Regular Educator in Mainstreaming Processes 17-22 (May
25-29, 1977) (concept paper presented at the White House Conference on the Handicapped
Individual).
"
2
"The individualized education program for each child must include: ... (d) A statement
of specific educational services needed by the child, (determined without regard to the
availability of those services) .... ." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,986 (1976) (proposed 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.225). The correlative section in the new rules reads: "The individualized education
program for each child must include: ... (c) A statement of the specific special education
and related services to be provided to the child, and the extent to which the child will be
able to participate in regular education programs .... 42 Fed. Reg. 42,491 (1977) (§
121a.346).
831n an attempt to quickly revert to the early treatment of handicapped children, i e., put-
ting them in a regular classroom, educators may be overcompensating. There still is a need
for some handicapped students to get segregated instruction..
The recent and rapid growth of special classes for the mentally retarded has
come under attack. The attack is largely a result of the misuse of special
education classes as dumping grounds for some children and of the total ex-
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child from inappropriate placement. Unless a teacher notices inap-
propriate programing, correction is left to the chance or hope that the
parent will not only realize the problem, but will also follow the due pro-
cess procedures to get the individualized programing changed . 4
However, even the due process procedures may fail to rectify the ex-
perts' mistake. The parent has the burden of proof, which may be dif-
ficult to meet. In a section at the state conference of the Wisconsin
Association for Children with Learning Disabilities, held in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, on October 7-8, 1977, parents of handicapped children shared
their legal problems. The most common complaint was that one educator
would not testify against another. This unified front of educators is com-
parable to the unified front of medical doctors in malpractice cases.
Although the teacher and members of the IEP planning group are not
legally liable for a handicapped student's failure to meet his IEP goals,
the reflection on professional reputations is a sufficient barrier to open
colleague testimony.8 5 That testimony is vital in the administrative
apellate process and a subsequent civil action, since proof of inap-
propriate programing is a specialized educational matter.
The basic practical problem in implementation is compelling the
educators to meet and exceed their professional best when devising and
applying the IEP. Compulsion is necessary to the extent that there is a
lack of time, money, services, and other resources and that there are
clusion of others from public education. A growing number of courts and
legislatures has recognized these abuses. This recognition is reflected in a
growing demand that mentally retarded children be returned to "regular
classes."
There is a real danger that this process is becoming an overreaction to past
abuses and that in the stampede to return mentally retarded students to the
regular classroom, the particular needs of individual students will be ignored.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION. THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 268 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer eds. 1976)("Reaction Comment" by Percy Bates to the preceding section, "The Children Who Wait"
by Stanley Herr).
"
4The Act and the federal rules outline the administrative appellate procedures and the
right to take an unsatisfactory appellate result to the local court. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415,
1417 (Supp. 1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,494-96 (1977) (§§ 121a.500-.514). One of the most in-
novative features of the appellate process is the parent's right to get an independent
educational evaluation at public expense. However, the public agency will probably opt for
the "mediation" hearing. Id § 121a.506. If that impartial hearing results in a determina-
tion that the educational program is appropriate, the parent loses the right to an indepen-
dent educational evaluation at public expense; the evaluation must be at the parent's ex-
pense if one is still desired. Id § 121a.503. Because the public agency can force a mediation
hearing by its own initiative, it could effectively vitiate the right to publicly supported in-
dependent evaluations. Id § 121a.506.
'
5Although the new rules dropped the phrase that the IEP is "not legally binding con-
tract," the rules do not hold the educators accountable for the child's failure in reaching
IEP goals. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,491 (1977) (§ 121a.349). Although legally it would be productive
to have a "contract for educational goods," the child may be just as responsible for any
failure, each child has a unique pattern of educational development, and it would be
psychologically undesirable to force a teacher to teach, since that's the teacher's respon-
sibility and presumed goal anyway. Furthermore, the teacher helps develop the IEP and
could easily affect its content so that all its goals would be easily obtainable. Just as there
is a difference between statutes and guidelines, the IEP is a collection not of rules but of
goals.
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other educational duties and interests vying for their time and attention.
There is the additional factor of newness. At this point no one is totally
sure how the Act and new rules are to be effected, and the concept of
mainstreaming is a relatively new educational theory. Perhaps guidance
by the supervising entities will diminish the need for compulsion.
RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
In an attempt to resolve the crucial issue of appropriate malnstreaming
of handicapped children, several considerations need to be recognized as
fundamental. Programs that have answered these questions effectively
have found a measure of success.
First, can effective mainstreaming be implemented by continuing
categorization of handicapped children by separating them via assumed
inherent abilities as measured by norm-referenced standardized tests
without pinpointing specific needs such as how the children can best
learn within the curriculum? The very basis of the categorization ap-
proach is to measure constant traits within individuals in order to label
them for primary groupings, thus providing standardized procedures for
placement in educational settings. Not only does such a practice
segregate and stereotype the individual toward supposed possession of
group behaviors, but it negates assessing the individual's infinite capaci-
ty to change and breadth of potential, and disallows the possibility of
placement in educational environments designed specifically to develop
new learning/coping skills.86 Criterion-referenced measures and informal
diagnostic teaching procedures over a period of time that relate to possi-
ble learning outcomes can best assist in pinpointing where to proceed in
instruction.8 7 If a teacher is to teach a handicapped child in the primary
unit, an assessment of the child that will be most serviceable is one that
identifies specific areas of educational need as determined over time in
more favorable learning formats and procedures. 8 In this way, instruc-
tional strategies and materials can best be organized and applied within a
meaningful plan for the child no matter where he is on the continuum of
service in the least restrictive environment model (i.e., cascade model).
,6 PUT SIMPLY-mainstreaming means putting handicapped children back in
the regular classroom for selected experiences. Mainstreaming is, more strict-
ly: (1) an attitudinal system that reinforces the position that all children can
learn when attention is given to individual learning styles, learning rates, and
varied content; (2) a management system that allows for optional routes to
goal achievement; and (3) an organizational support system that provides for
the educational needs of all children. Effective mainstreaming addresses the
academic and social needs of all youngsters in the least restrictive educational
environment. Each categorical designation tends to segregate these in-
dividuals from the mainstream of people.
Monaco, Mainstreaming, Who?, 13 SCI. & CHILDREN No. 6, at 11 (1976). See also M.
REYNOLDS. CATEGORIES AND VARIABLES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION. EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN IN
REGULAR CLASSROOMS (1970); Gilhool, Education: An Inalienable Right, 39 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 597 (1973); Martin, Individualism and Behaviorism as Future Trends in
Educating Handicapped Children, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 517 (1972); Lilly, Special
Education: A Teapot in a Tempest 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 43 (1970).
8'McClelland, Testing for Competence Rather than for "Intelligence", 28 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (1973).
"'S. Deno & P. Mirkin, supra note 8.
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Further, such assessment lends itself toward more accurate structuring
of objectives in the IEP, evaluation of progress toward meeting the ob-
jectives, and communicating program plans to all concerned, including
the child.
Second, can effective mainstreaming be implemented without employ-
ing an educational program model that utilizes individualized instruc-
tion, flexible pupil grouping, and team teaching? Can it be implemented
without having teachers (regular and special) trained in procedures that
will enhance the use of each for children having varying learning needs?
"While some people delight in seeing self-contained classes eliminated, it
is forgotten that unless basic changes are made in programing, the
children are put back into the very failure situations which originally led
to their specialized placements."8 9 As John Ryor, president of the Na-
tional Education Association, has warned, "Mainstreaming is one of the
most complex educational innovations ever undertaken and for boards
and administrators to plunge their schools into it without advance
preparation carries great potential harm for regular and special students
and for teachers as well." 90 To move handicapped pupils up to continuum
of the least restrictive environment model in education embodies within
it the commitment to individualize instruction for all children. Failure to
recognize this is to abandon these pupils to undifferentiated classrooms.9'
Some schools have moved to the establishment of resource teacher posi-
tions to assist classroom teachers in programing and teaching handi-
capped pupils. However, only too often these teachers are relegated to
small resource rooms to work with the handicapped either clinically or in
small groups via "pull-out" schedules from the mainstream.92 The at-
titude or position that prevails is that it is up to the resource teacher to
help ameliorate the handicapped pupils' disabilites and "catch-up" with
the traditional undifferentiated curriculum of the mainstream. The IEP's
that are written fail to address differentiated programing and teaching in
the regular classroom where up to 50 percent of identified handicapped
children now spend most of their days.9 3 Because of it, the regular
classroom becomes a very frustrating and defeating setting for many of
these children. If resource teachers are to be utilized in schools, they need
to assist in individualizing instruction, structuring learning task/interest
groups, arranging differentiated learning settings, and at times team
teach for the benefit of the handicapped pupils in the regular classroom.
Handicapped pupils should be mainstreamed into regular classroom set-
tings only when IEP's address appropriate programing within the
classroom and show response to how they can best learn in that setting.
"Reger, What Does 'Mainstreaming" Mean?, 7 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 513-14 (1974).
90 Ryor, Mainstreaming, TODAY'S EDUc. 5 (Mar.-Apr. 1976).
"
tThe Futures of Children--Categories, Labels, and Their Consequences, A Summary (N.
Hobbs, Project Dir. 1975) (available from the Center for the Study of Families and
Children, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee).
92K. Berry, supra note 7, at 24.
'3S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975) (Education for All Handicapped
Children Act).
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Handicapped children may be separated at times on the basis of the kind
of learning tasks appropriate for them, but whenever appropriate, they
should be learning alongside their peers if not with them.
Thirdly, can appropriate mainstreaming ever become a reality if we
continue regular and special education as separate systems? These
systems have developed their own approaches to personnel training,
teacher certification, program funding, administration of programs, and
service delivery. 94 Collaboration among these separate functions is now
imperative. Institutions of higher education, state educational agencies,
and local educational agencies need to establish comprehensive training
models for both pre-service and inservice training that will provide per-
sonnel development programs at all levels.95 Some training objectives
and models have already been initiated.96 School administrators, special
education personnel, and regular educators need to be involved .together
in retraining and developing appropriate mainstreaming procedures for
handicapped children. Inservice programs need to deal with problems at
all levels so they solve them together.
The desired educational methods outlined above can be put into effect.
Admittedly the present practices fall short of the ideal. However, the Act
and the new rules contain language and procedures that would enable the
Office of Education or the state educational agency to push desired prac-
tices.
The first innovation of presented goals and priorities now allows the
state agency freedom in determining when the local agency has met the
initial goals and the first priority. Thus the state agency governs when
funding can be shifted to second priority children. By requiring the local
agency to present very specific and very individualized IEP's for first
priority children before allowing expenditures on second priority
children, the state can force the local agency to develop at least some op-
timal IEP's and the methods or proper form for producing them. In
regard to the second priority, the state has the power to foster inservice
training programs. The state also has the power to review the programs.
The second innovation is the planning conference. It is valuable that a
parent now has statutory rights in the determination of the child's educa-
tional future. But the parent's ability to protect the child's legal interest
fully is inadequate. There should be an impartial third party or an ad-
vocate for the child's interests in the planning group. The representative
of the public agency most likely would not meet this objective. However,
the agency could bring in a objective expert, and the same option is
available to the parent.97 Ideally the expert would be familiar with both
91S. Deno & P. Mirkin, supra note 8.
'520 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (Supp. 1975).96E. DENO. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED IN EPDA EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN PROGRAM
59-60 (1975) (U.S. Office of Education draft); Barry, The Exceptional Child Component in
Teacher Corps, 10 TED NEWSIETTER 18 (1974).
'142 Fed. Reg. 42,490 (1977) (§ 121a.344(a)(5).
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educational and legal theories. Even if there is an educational expert in
an impartial role, it would be helpful to have an attorney act as the child's
representative, if merely to review the IEP in light of applicable laws.9 8 A
professional advocate of the child's interests would improve the balance
of the planning session immensely and would insure that the goals of the
Act and federal rules would be met.
The third innovation deals primarily with obtaining compliance with
the Act, the federal rules, and the proposed programs under them. A pro-
fessional advocate for the child would enhance compliance. The federal
government also has considerable power to require specific practices,
since it can refuse the state agency's financial requests until the agency
includes those practices in its annual program plan. If the practices are
just verbalized in the program plan and are not followed in actuality, the
federal government can withdraw the funding. Similarly, if a local educa-
tional agency fails to follow practices required by the state agency, the
state agency can enter the local agency's jurisdiction and provide the
handicapped students with more appropriate programs. The federal and
state entities have almost unlimited power due to the generalities of the
new rules. If they fail to use that power to full advantage, it is feasible
that a parent could encourage its use by lobbying, following the due pro-
cess procedures, and ultimately bringing the case before the courts. The
child has an enforceable civil right to a free appropriate public education,
which a court could interpret as a right to the optimal education for the
child as an individual. That education should and necessarily must result
'from the best educational theories and practices presently available.
By requiring specific and individualized IEP's and by encouraging
varied inservice training programs, the federal, state, and local educa-
tional agencies can facilitate proper mainstreaming. Enforcement power
provided by the Act and federal rules lies with the educational agencies
at all levels and with the parent. It is their responsibility to assure the
handicapped child a free appropriate public education.
9See generally CHILDREN IN THE COURTS--THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION (G. Newman
ed. 1967); 2 & 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED (B. Ennis & P. Friedman
eds. 1973); THE YOUNGEST MINORITY II (S. Katz ed. 1977); THE YOUNGEST MINORITY (S.
Katz ed. 1974).
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